Feinberg’s conception and Genetic Engineering

This is one of the central themes of Feinberg’s conception that the child be given as much freedom as possibility with respect to being able to being able to choose for themselves what it is that constitutes the good life. An intervention such as skin the randomly changes colour clearly is one that would restrict the conceptions available. The argument may still be made that even if certain conceptions of the good life have been removed from the child, these have been replaced with others that more than make up for the loss. There are two problems with this; the first is that with any claim like the one above we have to first be certain that the intervention in question is not one that will violate any of the child’s rights first. Only once this has been established can we begin to consider anything else and with respect to something like skin that change colour I suspect that it may violate some of the child’s rights. The other problem is that it is the case that a choice has been removed from the child. The parents’ idea of the good life, that having skin that changes colour is a good thing, has been placed upon the child before the child has had the opportunity to consider whether or not this intervention is one that fits into their conception of the good life.